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INTRODUCTION 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act allows racial minorities1 to prevent 
the use of electoral systems and other voting laws that have discriminatory 
“results,” without having to secure a federal court finding that those elec-
toral systems or voting laws are purposefully discriminatory.2  Since 1982, 
this results standard has primarily been used to replace at-large election 
                                                                                                                          
 
 ∗  Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting 
Section.  J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.S.J., Northwestern University.  The 
views expressed in this Article do not necessarily represent those of the United States De-
partment of Justice.  Thanks to Bob Berman, Brad Brooks-Rubin, Chris Coates, and Joe 
Rich for their helpful comments. 
 1. The terms “race” or “racial” are used throughout this Article to also encompass 
the language minority groups covered by section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Ten-
nessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2007-13 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using the term 
“race” to encompass a Court precedent involving Puerto Rican voters).  The term “language 
minority group” in the Voting Rights Act covers Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, Native 
Americans, and those of Spanish heritage.  42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(3) (2000). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000). 
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systems with single-member districts so that at least one of those districts 
contains a majority of persons of a racial minority group.3  These districts 
then give those minority persons the opportunity to safely elect a candidate 
of their choice, with the winning candidate often being a member of the 
same race as the minority voters who make up the majority of the district’s 
population.4 
While section 2 has been a fixture of the Nation’s electoral landscape 
for more than two decades, recent decisions from the Supreme Court have 
caused a number of commentators to question the statute’s constitutional 
validity,5 with two threads of the Court’s jurisprudence causing this ques-
tioning.  First, the Court has embarked upon a federalism revolution that 
has provided state and local governments with much greater protection 
from the reach of Congress.6  Second, the Court has exhibited a general 
distaste for race-based remedies, as evidenced by the shift toward a strict 
nondiscrimination view of equal protection,7 with the Court generally only 
being willing to allow the implementation of a race-based remedy when 
presented with very compelling and specific evidence of past purposeful 
discrimination.8  
                                                                                                                          
 
 3. See Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the 
Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH 378, 383-86 (Chandler David-
son & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).  See also Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Re-
apportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 739-40 (1998). 
Until the 1980s, most local elections were conducted at large, and most 
southern states elected at least some of their state legislators from mul-
timember districts.  But after a decade of intense litigation, most juris-
dictions with substantial black populations had switched to election sys-
tems that contained at least some single-member districts, and state leg-
islatures were elected entirely from single-member districts, at least 
some of which were majority black. 
Id. 
 4. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 481-82 (2003) (describing the likely 
electoral results in districts that safely allow minority voters to elect a candidate of choice). 
 5. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to 
Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2403 n.357 (2003) (listing commentators who have questioned the 
constitutionality of section 2). 
 6. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (restraining federal 
power over state officials in finding the Brady Bill unconstitutional). 
 7. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (describing the “central 
mandate” of the Equal Protection Clause as “racial neutrality in governmental decisionmak-
ing.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 221-24 (1995) 
(describing the parameters of the Court’s equal protection doctrine).  Accord Michelle Ad-
ams, Searching for Strict Scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1941, 1942-43 
(2004) (describing how a number of recent decisions had “suggested a Court that was poised 
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These two big-picture trends converge with the Court’s adoption of 
the congruence and proportionality9 doctrine as a limitation on Congress’ 
ability to use the enforcement power it has been granted under the Recon-
struction Amendments.10  Often, Congress uses its enforcement power to 
pass statutes that allow federal courts to remedy or deter activity by state 
and local governments that does not rise to the level of a constitutional vio-
lation as defined by the Court—the quintessential example of this being 
when Congress passes a statute that allows for federal courts to provide 
remedies upon a finding of discriminatory effect, without having to find 
that an unconstitutional purpose was at work.  Thus, it is unsurprising that 
the Court’s dual motivations for establishing this new11 congruence and 
proportionality doctrine have been to protect state and local governments 
from federal interference, and to protect the Court’s own ability to define 
the parameters of constitutional law.12  In practice, the doctrine protects 
these federalism and separation of powers values by requiring Congress to 
amass a compelling factual record of constitutional violations by state and 
local governments before enacting a remedy that provides more protection 
for citizens against these governmental entities than the Court would pro-
vide under the Constitution standing alone.13   
Section 2’s constitutionality appears to hinge upon its ability to be 
congruent and proportional.14  However, section 2 conflicts with federalism 
values because it allows the federal courts to intrude upon the electoral 
process of state and local governments.  It also conflicts with separation of 
                                                                                                                          
 
to strike down all governmental uses of race.”). 
 9. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (adopting the congru-
ence and proportionality standard). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2, XIV, § 5, XV, § 2. 
 11. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 26, 117 (2000) (describing congruence and proportionality as a “new rule of doc-
trine.”). 
         12. See David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and 
Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 37 (1997) (describ-
ing the twin rationales for congruence and proportionality). 
 13. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 
(2001). 
         14. I say “appears” because the Court has only applied its congruence and propor-
tionality doctrine to congressional remedies passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and has not yet applied this doctrine to congressional remedies passed pursuant to the Fif-
teenth Amendment.  Compare Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (using the congruence and proportion-
ality doctrine to reject legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment) with City of Rome 
v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (upholding a voting rights remedy under the Fifteenth 
Amendment prior to the establishment of the congruence and proportionality doctrine).  See 
also Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 
DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 273-77 (2003). 
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powers values by providing a race-based remedy without a specific and 
compelling showing of unconstitutional racial discrimination.  Put more 
concretely, section 2 provides more protection for citizens against state and 
local governments than the Court would provide under the Constitution 
itself by replacing a constitutional purpose test with a statutory results 
test15—and this has been done in the arguable absence of a compelling 
enough legislative history of constitutional violations.16 
Despite the fact that a number of commentators have questioned the 
validity of section 2 under the congruence and proportionality standard, 
federal courts have continued in their unanimous endorsement of the con-
stitutionality of this voting rights remedy.17  This overwhelming judicial 
support can be explained by a number of practical reasons, including: the 
Court’s historic (i.e., pre-Rehnquist Court) willingness to uphold Voting 
Rights Act remedies that greatly intrude into state and local prerogatives18 
and that allow minority plaintiffs to deter or prevent the implementation of 
voting laws without having to prove purposeful discrimination;19 the cur-
rent Court’s use of the Voting Rights Act as a shining example of a valid 
use of Congress’ enforcement power even in those decisions in which the 
Court has scaled back Congress’ ability to exercise that power;20 and the 
                                                                                                                          
 
 15. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000) (applying results test to challenges to 
voting laws) with City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion) (ap-
plying purpose test to challenges to voting laws). 
 16. Compare Jennifer G. Presto, The 1982 Amendments to Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act: Constitutionality After City of Boerne, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609, 620 
(2004) (noting that “[t]he legislative history of the amendments to section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, however, shows that Congress appeared to be primarily concerned with the 
meaning of the amendments and the prospective effect they would have on the electoral 
process, rather than on a history of discrimination preceding them.”) with Pamela S. Karlan, 
Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 733 (1997) (noting that “[t]he record before Congress in 1982 
revealed numerous ‘modern instances of generally applicable [election] laws passed because 
of [racial] bigotry.’”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).   
 17. United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 905 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding 
section 2 while noting that the decision “join[s] all of the other ‘lower courts [that] have 
unanimously affirmed [section 2’s constitutionality].’”) (citation omitted). 
         18. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (upholding an 
“array of potent weapons” designed to prevent voting discrimination by state and local 
governments).  See also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526 (describing the remedies in the Voting 
Rights Act as “strong” and “unprecedented.”). 
         19. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173 (upholding effects test found in section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act).  See also Mississippi Repub. Exec. Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 
1002, aff’g Jordan v. Winter, 604 F. Supp. 807, 811 (N.D. Miss. 1984) (three-judge panel) 
(upholding constitutionality of section 2). 
 20. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373-74 (distinguishing the propriety of the Voting 
Rights Act with the impropriety of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); United 
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ability of federal judges to count votes on the current Court because Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, who likely represents the swing vote on this mat-
ter,21 has strongly implied that she would uphold section 2.22 
In this Article, I try to move beyond these arguments of judicial reality 
to provide a bit more of a theoretical underpinning for why section 2 
plainly conforms to the current Court’s (or, for that matter, any moderately 
conservative Court’s) vision of the scope of Congress’ enforcement power.  
In doing so, I identify three core values that demonstrate section 2’s valid-
ity as an exercise in what might be called “affirmative democracy.”  The 
first value is that racial discrimination in voting amounts to a context where 
the Court will allow a greater amount of race-based decision-making that 
favors racial minorities and a greater amount of congressional imposition 
of remedies against state and local governments.23  The second value is that 
section 2 amounts to only a small encroachment on the Court’s ability to 
define the substance of constitutional law because section 2 closely con-
forms to the Court’s own equal protection doctrine as it relates to racial 
discrimination in general and, particularly, as it relates to racial discrimina-
tion in voting.  The third value is that section 2 amounts to a relatively 
small burden on federalism—a burden probably not much greater than the 
federalism burden imposed by the Constitution itself. 
I.     RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IS DIFFERENT 
The key principle underlying the premise that racial discrimination in 
voting is different is the idea of context.  The Court’s recent decisions, 
most notably in the affirmative action and racial gerrymandering cases, 
show that it will allow a greater use of race-based remedies depending on 
the context.  Similarly, other recent decisions, most notably in cases involv-
ing the Family and Medical Leave Act and Title II of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, show that in some contexts Congress may make greater 
                                                                                                                          
 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000) (distinguishing the propriety of the Voting 
Rights Act with the impropriety of the Violence Against Women Act). 
 21. John Matthew Guard, “Impotent Figureheads?” State Sovereign Immunity, 
Federalism, and the Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Lopez v. 
Monterey County and City of Boerne v. Flores, 74 TUL. L. REV. 329, 359 (1999).  “Any 
determination of section 2’s constitutionality will probably hinge on Justice O’Connor’s 
vote.”  Id. 
 22. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990-92 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring).   
         23. I have previously explored the idea that voting rights remedies might have less 
of a problem with the Court’s congruence and proportionality doctrine than other remedies 
the Court has recently rejected.  Pitts, supra note 14, at 268-77.  This Article seeks to further 
expand upon this idea. 
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use of its enforcement power.  So, the aim of this section is to briefly dem-
onstrate that racial discrimination in voting amounts to a context in which 
the Court will allow both a greater use of race-based remedies and a greater 
use of the enforcement power.  However, even with the Court’s willingness 
to loosen its grip in these contexts, it remains important to keep in mind 
that definite limits accompany both the use of race-based remedies and 
Congress’ use of its enforcement power.  Accordingly, this section con-
cludes with a short discussion of these limits. 
A.     RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IS A DIFFERENT CONTEXT FROM A 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUAL PROTECTION PERSPECTIVE 
The general trend of the Court’s equal protection doctrine has been a 
move toward the idea that equal protection means nondiscrimination 
against any individual.  This has played itself out in a shift toward: (1) 
eliminating the government’s use of race to counteract any “societal” dis-
crimination that occurred (or is occurring) in this Nation;24 (2) applying 
strict scrutiny to every governmental use of race, including the use of race 
designed to favor racial minorities;25 (3) finding any governmental action 
subjected to strict scrutiny to be unconstitutional unless a compelling show-
ing of purposeful racial discrimination can be demonstrated;26 and (4) re-
quiring a greater and more specific evidentiary basis of actual purposeful 
discrimination in order to uphold the government’s use of a race-based 
remedy.27 
                                                                                                                          
 
 24. Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 60, 69 (2004) (describing how the Court has not embraced the idea that a 
race-based remedy “can be justified as compensation for past societal discrimination.”); 
Michael Selmi, Remedying Societal Discrimination Through the Spending Power, 80 N.C. 
L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2002) (describing how “the Supreme Court has consistently held that a 
desire to remedy societal discrimination provides a constitutionally inadequate basis for 
race-conscious affirmative action plans.”). 
 25. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (noting that the “standard of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular 
classification” and “that any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any 
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting 
that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”). 
 26. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (allowing that some of the 
Court’s opinions might have been “read to suggest that remedying past discrimination is the 
only permissible justification for race-based governmental action.”). 
 27. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993) (allowing that there is “a significant 
state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination . . . [b]ut the State must 
have a strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that remedial action [is] necessary.”) (inter-
nal quotes omitted).  See also Bush, 517 U.S. at 982 (plurality opinion). 
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Recently, though, these principles have been shown to have some 
“play in the joints.”28  The racial gerrymandering decisions demonstrate 
that not all purposeful uses of race by the government will end up being 
subjected to strict scrutiny.29  When a government draws electoral districts, 
the use of race will only become subject to strict scrutiny when racial con-
siderations predominate in the process in such a way as to subordinate tra-
ditional districting principles (e.g., compactness).30  The affirmative action 
decisions demonstrate that the government’s use of race can survive strict 
scrutiny despite the lack of compelling evidence of purposeful, unconstitu-
tional discrimination on the part of the government entity seeking to make 
race-based decisions.31 
Admittedly, gerrymandering differs from affirmative action in that the 
latter type of government activity immediately invokes strict scrutiny and 
the former does not;32 however, in the big picture, it would appear that the 
Court’s decisions in both areas represent slices from the same pie.33  This is 
                                                                                                                          
 
 A State interest in remedying discrimination is compelling when two 
conditions are satisfied.  First, the discrimination that the State seeks to 
remedy must be specific, “identified discrimination”; second, the State 
“must have had a ‘strong basis in evidence’ to conclude that remedial 
action was necessary, ‘before it embarks on an affirmative action pro-
gram.’” 
Id. (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 910 (1996)). 
 28. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004). 
 29. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001).  “Race must not simply have 
been a motivation for the drawing of a majority-minority district, but the predominant factor 
motivating the legislature’s districting decision.”  Id. (internal cites, emphasis, and quotes 
omitted).  See also Michelle Adams, Grutter v. Bollinger: This Generation’s Brown v. 
Board of Education?, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 755, 768 (2004) (describing how the Court has 
“taken its foot off the accelerator” in the voting rights context by making it less likely that a 
race-based redistricting will be struck down as unconstitutional). 
 30. Bush, 517 U.S. at 959 (plurality opinion).  “For strict scrutiny to apply, the 
plaintiffs must prove that other, legitimate districting principles were subordinated to race.”  
Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
 31. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325-30 (describing how the University of Michigan Law 
School had a compelling interest in using race even in the absence of evidence of past dis-
crimination). 
 32. The distinction between these cases is that the affirmative action decisions 
involve government conduct that is facially race-based, whereas the racial gerrymandering 
decisions involve government conduct that is facially race-neutral.  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 
213 (distinguishing between “government conduct that is explicitly race-based and govern-
ment conduct that, although facially race-neutral, results in a racially disproportionate im-
pact and is motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.”). 
 33. Professor Pamela S. Karlan presciently made the connection between racial 
gerrymandering and affirmative action prior to the Court’s recent affirmative action deci-
sions.  See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative 
Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569 (2002). 
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because context is what really fuels these allowances of race-based gov-
ernment decision-making, in that a government’s use of race to benefit 
racial minorities will be treated differently by the Court depending on the 
context—this lesson of context being explicit with regard to affirmative 
action34 and, I would argue, implicit with regard to voting rights because 
the affirmative action decision cites a voting rights case for this principle of 
context.35  In addition, I would contend that voting rights is a different con-
text because the Court carved out a completely new doctrine in the racial 
gerrymandering cases to address the use of race in redistricting.36   
But if context makes all the difference, then the question becomes 
why.  Why should one context be different from another when it comes to 
the use of race in government decision-making?  More to the point, why 
would voting and higher education form a different context for the gov-
ernment’s use of race to benefit certain minority groups?  What makes 
these areas distinctive?  These questions are important because, without a 
theoretical underpinning for differentiating the use of race in different con-
texts, the Court’s jurisprudence takes on the character of unprincipled 
judges enforcing their own legislative preferences.   
In my view, the simple theoretical answer comes from the idea that 
the Court has traditionally considered education and voting to be more 
“fundamental.”37  Yet to describe education and voting as “fundamental” 
amounts to “little more than a [judicial] play upon words.”38  What makes 
                                                                                                                          
 
 34. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.  “Context matters when reviewing race-based gov-
ernmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.”  Id. 
 35. Id. (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)). 
         36. Prior to the decisions in the racial gerrymandering cases, when the government 
took an action that used race in a facial manner, the Court would use strict scrutiny to de-
termine whether the government action was unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. 
200.  In the alternative, if the government used race in a non-facial manner, the Court would 
use a discriminatory purpose analysis to determine whether the government action was 
unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252 (1977).  In the racial gerrymandering cases, the Court does not either immediately sub-
ject the use of race to strict scrutiny nor find that the use of race amounts to an unconstitu-
tional discriminatory purpose.  Instead, the Court uses a two-step process that has no peer in 
the Court’s racial discrimination jurisprudence in that it first decides whether race was a 
predominant factor and, if so, then decides whether the use of race complies with strict 
scrutiny.  See, e.g., Bush, 517 U.S. at 952. 
 37. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983) (describing as 
“fundamental” the right to be free of racial segregation in education); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (describing voting as “a fundamental matter in a free and democ-
ratic society.”).  See also Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 
(1966) (describing voting as “too precious [and] too fundamental” to be burdened by the 
imposition of a poll tax). 
 38. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1929). 
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them fundamental, at least to this Court, appears to be the essential role 
higher education and voting play in fostering the Nation’s democracy.  The 
use of race in higher education to benefit racial minorities receives more 
deference from the Court in large part because higher education creates 
good citizens, leads to greater participation in the Nation’s civic life, and 
trains the future leaders of the Nation;39 and, absent the use of race in 
higher education, the Nation’s democracy might be weakened by a lack of 
diversity that would cause the Nation’s democracy to be perceived as ille-
gitimate in the eyes of many citizens.40 
While the current Court has yet to explicitly apply these ideas of the 
fundamental nature of our democracy to the government’s use of race to 
benefit racial minorities in the voting context, it would not seem to be 
much of a leap to do so.41  Indeed, nothing could more directly implicate 
the fundamental nature of our democracy than the act of casting ballots and 
electing candidates.42  Moreover, what good would it be if higher education 
created a diverse group of good citizens if some of those citizens were then 
denied the right to cast a ballot by inequitable voter registration laws?43  
And what good would it be to allow higher education to foster more diverse 
participation in the Nation’s civic life and to create a diverse set of leaders 
that legitimizes the democratic process in the eyes of the populace if, upon 
graduation, some citizens get shut out of the political process because racial 
bloc voting prevents them from getting elected at the local and state 
level?44 
                                                                                                                          
 
 39. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.  Accord Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) 
(describing the Nation’s public schools as “a most vital civil institution for the preservation 
of a democratic system of government.”). 
 40. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.  “[I]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with legiti-
macy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to 
talented and qualified individuals of every race . . . .”  Id.  See also id. (stating that “[a]ll 
members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity 
of the educational institutions that provide this training.”).  Accord Kramer v. Union Free 
Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).  “Any unjustified discrimination in determin-
ing who may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines 
the legitimacy of representative government.”  Id. 
         41. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (analogizing equal pro-
tection claims involving voting and education). 
         42. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 495-96 (2000) (describing “the exercise of 
the voting franchise” as “the most basic level of the democratic process.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Miss. State Chapter, Operation PUSH, Inc. v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that Mississippi’s voter registration laws violated section 2). 
 44. While racial bloc voting does form some of the underpinning for the idea that 
voting is different, it will only be one small part of a moderately conservative Court’s view 
of why voting is different.  In other words, such a Court seems highly unlikely to adopt the 
view posited by some commentators that racial bloc voting amounts to present-day purpose-
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Voting also implicates the fundamental underpinnings of our democ-
racy because, as the Court informed us more than a century ago, voting 
preserves all rights.45  Basically, under this philosophy, the greater the ac-
cess to the political process provided to the minority group, the less incen-
tive government officials will have to engage in discrimination against that 
group.46  Put differently, greater access to voting allows racial minorities a 
much better chance to get nondiscriminatory treatment in “governmental 
services, such as public schools, housing, and law enforcement.”47  In an-
ecdotal terms, it is the switch from the pre-Voting Rights Act strict segre-
gationist Senator Strom Thurmond to the Senator Thurmond who, decades 
later, voted to extend the Act.48 
So, voting and higher education implicate core democratic values; yet 
that does not serve as the sole reason why they present a different context 
for the Court.  The use of race in voting and higher education gets an extra 
boost because these contexts implicate other constitutional areas where the 
Court traditionally shows some greater measure of judicial restraint.  
Higher education implicates First Amendment deference to academic free-
dom.49  Thus, universities receive greater leeway from the Court to chart 
their own course in determining how best to achieve their goal of properly 
educating students.50  Similarly, voting implicates the Court’s traditional 
                                                                                                                          
 
ful discrimination that serves as a unique justification for race-based voting remedies.  See 
generally, Karlan, supra note 16.  See also Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why 
Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1227-32 (1996) (engaging in an extended discus-
sion of racially polarized voting and positing that “race-conscious districts, unlike most 
affirmative action programs, can be seen as designed to prevent present-day discrimina-
tion.”).  Here are three brief reasons why: (1) such a Court would undoubtedly criticize 
traditional statistical analysis of bloc voting for failing to prove that racial discrimination 
and not some other factor, such as political preference, explains why voters cast their ballots 
along racial lines; (2) such a Court would likely find racial bloc voting to be purely private 
activity not reachable by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and that there is not 
enough of a causal nexus between historical discrimination by the government and racial 
bloc voting; and (3) such a Court, even if it did consider bloc voting to be government activ-
ity, would generally be interested in the nondiscrimination principle and would look dimly 
upon signing off on a racial remedy when both minority and non-minority voters engage in 
the same kind of race-based activity. 
 45. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (describing voting as “preserva-
tive of all rights.”). 
 46. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966). 
 47. Id. 
         48. See J.Y. Smith, Ex-Senator Thurmond Dies at 100, WASH. POST at A01 (June 
27, 2003) (describing Senator Thurmond’s shifting views during his career). 
         49. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).  
“Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has 
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.”  Id. 
 50. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.  “Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of 
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deference to the political process,51 to stay out of the “political thicket,”52 
and, in the opinion of at least one commentator, the First Amendment right 
of association.53  Of course, this does not create an absolute deference on 
either front—it merely provides a bit more leeway to government actors 
operating in these realms. 
In actuality, it is unsurprising that the Court would be a little bit more 
forgiving of the use of race to benefit racial minorities in certain contexts.  
A context-based analysis of the government’s use of race in its decision-
making mirrors the way the Court has handled its own task of determining 
whether government officials have acted with an unconstitutional discrimi-
natory purpose.  As Professor Daniel Ortiz recognized several years ago, 
the Court has generally made it easier for racial minorities to prove pur-
poseful racial discrimination in certain contexts, including voting and edu-
cation.54  So, if the Court seems willing to make it easier for racial minori-
ties to prove unconstitutional discrimination in education and voting, it 
seems logical to allow government actors some freedom to make decisions 
in these contexts that provide a bit of extra benefit to racial minorities.  
After all, if the Court holds government actors to a higher standard of non-
discrimination against racial minorities in certain contexts, then the least it 
can do is give these actors some greater amount of room to provide benefits 
to racial minorities so that these actors can keep themselves from running 
afoul of the Constitution.55 
B.     RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IS A DIFFERENT CONTEXT FROM A 
CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT POWER PERSPECTIVE 
For many years it appeared that Congress had pretty broad enforce-
ment power to apply whatever sort of civil rights remedies it wanted 
against state and local governments in order to prevent these entities from 
                                                                                                                          
 
giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions . . . .”  Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (declining 
to engage the federal judiciary in the political question of partisan gerrymandering). 
 52. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
         53. See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and 
the First Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209 (2003). 
 54. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 
1137 (1989) (describing how it is more difficult to prove intent in housing and employment 
discrimination cases than in cases involving voting, education, and jury selection). 
 55. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 977 (remarking on how the states should not be “trapped 
between the competing hazards of liability” when engaging in race-based districting to 
comply with section 2) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 291 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
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engaging in violations of the Reconstruction Amendments.  Essentially, 
this meant that the Court only required Congress to show that a rational 
basis existed for any civil rights remedy it passed.56  And while it is accu-
rate to say that Congress’ power to enact civil rights remedies was by no 
means absolute,57 Congress’ power could aptly be described as nearly ple-
nary.58 
The current Court, however, ended rational basis scrutiny for Con-
gress’ use of its enforcement power, replacing this deferential scrutiny with 
a much tougher test of “congruence and proportionality.”59  This test of 
congruence and proportionality has a number of nuances and considers a 
number of different factors that are too numerous to delimit here.60  What is 
important for our purposes is that, at its core, congruence and proportional-
ity first involves the Court’s determination of how often government actors 
have engaged in the actual constitutional violations that Congress seeks to 
remedy or prevent and then moves to a determination of whether Congress 
properly tailored its legislation to fit the nature and extent of the actual 
identified constitutional violations.61 
The Court’s initial implementations of congruence and proportionality 
doctrine indicated that the test would be almost impossible to meet62 and 
perhaps might be “fatal in fact”63 to any statute subjected to the doctrine.64  
                                                                                                                          
 
 56. Geoffrey Landward, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett 
and the Equal Education Opportunity Act: Another Act Bites the Dust, 2002 BYU EDUC. & 
L.J. 313, 318 (noting that before the 1990s Congress had enforcement power that was 
“seemingly limitless.”). 
 57. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 267-68 (1970) (holding that Congress 
could not use its enforcement power to lower the age requirement for state and local elec-
tions).  
         58. In addition to enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protec-
tion and the Fifteenth Amendment prohibition on racial discrimination in voting, Congress 
has the power to enforce provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states using the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968) (incorporating provisions of the Sixth Amendment into the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment).  See also Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 2011 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (de-
scribing incorporation doctrine). 
 59. Kimberley E. Dean, In Light of the Evil Presented: What Kind of Prophylactic 
Antidiscrimination Legislation Can Congress Enact After Garrett?, 43 B.C. L. REV. 697, 
728 (2002) (describing the current Court’s move from “the traditional rational relationship 
test . . . to a stricter congruence and proportionality test.”). 
         60. For a more detailed discussion of these factors, see Pitts, supra note 14, at 243-
46. 
         61. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-73 (conducting congruence and proportional-
ity inquiry). 
 62. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. C. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
660 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 63. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
 2/21/2005 12:00:51 AM 
2005] AFFIRMATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 195 
The Court’s first five considerations of congressional remedies passed un-
der the enforcement power involved a strict, searching, and skeptical look 
at the congressional record for evidence of constitutional violations.65  This 
skeptical inquiry included the Court taking a very narrow view of what 
served as proof of a constitutional violation66 and requiring those constitu-
tional violations to have occurred contemporaneously with passage of the 
congressional remedy.67  It also involved the Court only considering proof 
of governmental, not private, discrimination,68 and limiting such proof to 
constitutional violations involving only state, not local, government activ-
ity.69   
But then along came the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and 
Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Court found 
a couple of congressional remedies it could uphold.70  In doing so, the 
Court retreated from its extremely stringent and skeptical review of the 
congressional record.  Absent was a strict application of what the Court 
would consider as evidence of a constitutional violation.71  Absent was a 
                                                                                                                          
 
(famously characterizing how strict scrutiny seemed to work). 
         64. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegal, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidis-
crimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 477 (2000) (compar-
ing congruence and proportionality to strict scrutiny). 
 65. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 
125 (2001) (describing how the Court engaged in “searching, skeptical review” of the record 
of constitutional violations that supported enactment of the congressional remedy).  See also 
Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights, 152 
U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1749 (2004) (describing how the initial applications of the congruence 
and proportionality doctrine “created the impression that it had become quite difficult for 
Congress to tap [its enforcement power].”). 
 66. Katz, supra note 5, at 2364 n.130.  “While the Court has not wholly rejected 
anecdotal evidence suggesting unconstitutional conduct, it has treated such examples with 
considerable skepticism and indicated its preference for examples of adjudicated constitu-
tional violations.”  Id. 
 67. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369 n.6 (noting a lack of evidence of unconstitutional 
disability discrimination at the time Congress adopted the ADA).  See also John Alan Doran 
& Christopher Michael Mason, Disproportionate Incongruity: State Sovereign Immunity 
and the Future of Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 2003 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. 
C.L. 1, 44-45 (noting the need for a record of contemporaneous discrimination). 
 68. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371-72 (rejecting evidence of disability discrimination by 
private-sector employers). 
 69. Id. at 368 (noting that Congress’ enforcement power “is appropriately exercised 
only in response to state transgressions”) (emphasis added). 
 70. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (upholding Title II of the Americans With Disabilities 
Act); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding Family and 
Medical Leave Act). 
 71. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2000 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing evidence 
relied on by the majority opinion as “brief anecdotes . . . that were not sufficiently detailed 
to determine whether” unconstitutional activity had occurred).  See also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 
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strict requirement of recent constitutional violations.72  Absent was a strict 
mandate that only discrimination engaged in by state governments could 
serve as the evidentiary basis for the remedy.73 
Why this shift?  The difference primarily seemed to lie in the fact that 
the FMLA and Title II operated in a realm where the Court itself was more 
protective of constitutional rights.  For example, the FMLA targeted gender 
discrimination, a type of discrimination that the Court protects against by 
using a heightened level of equal protection scrutiny.74  Similarly, Title 
II—at least as applied to access to the court system—also implicated con-
stitutional rights deemed of greater importance to the Court.75  This then 
required a substantially different review than congressional remedies the 
Court recently rejected, which had targeted types of governmental classifi-
cations, such as age, to which the Court provides a lesser level of scru-
tiny.76 
What one should take from this back and forth is that what’s really go-
ing on in the congruence and proportionality decisions parallels what’s 
happening on the substantive equal protection front in the affirmative ac-
tion and racial gerrymandering decisions: the context surrounding the rem-
edy matters in a big way.  Congress will have greater freedom in terms of 
compiling a record of actual constitutional violations when it passes reme-
dies to enforce “core” constitutional values—or at least what the Court 
views as “core” constitutional values.  When Congress acts to protect citi-
zens from the types of discrimination that the Court works harder to pre-
                                                                                                                          
 
746 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for failing to require “spe-
cific” evidence of constitutional violations). 
 72. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 748 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s major-
ity opinion for failing to require evidence of contemporaneous constitutional violations). 
 73. Id. at 730 (relying on surveys of private-sector employment practices as evi-
dence to support the constitutionality of the FMLA).  See also Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1999 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for considering evidence that 
“does not concern unconstitutional action by the States”) (emphasis in original). 
 74. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728.  “We have held that statutory classifications that distin-
guish between males and females are subject to heightened scrutiny.”  Id. 
 75. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988 (describing how Title II, as it related to access to the 
courts, “seeks to enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of 
which are subject to more searching judicial scrutiny.”).  It is important to note that the 
Court treats subcategories of discrimination differently.  For instance, Title I of the ADA 
received a stricter form of congruence and proportionality review because it implicated 
disability discrimination in the context of employment.  In contrast, Title II received an 
easier form of review because it implicated disability discrimination in the context of access 
to the courts. 
 76. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.  “Because the standard for demonstrating the constitu-
tionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet . . . it was easier for Con-
gress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”  Id. 
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vent, such as gender discrimination, then the Court will give Congress 
wider berth in passing civil rights remedies; but when Congress acts to 
protect citizens from the types of discrimination to which the Court pro-
vides lesser protection, such as age discrimination, then the Court will give 
Congress very little, if any, room to maneuver.77 
In a way, congruence and proportionality may be adopting its own 
tiers of scrutiny akin to the tiers of scrutiny the Court uses in its equal pro-
tection doctrine.  The Court seems likely to engage in a “strict” congruence 
and proportionality analysis when Congress legislates in arenas where the 
Court only provides rational basis scrutiny, with this strict congruence and 
proportionality analysis resulting in the need for Congress to compile an 
extensive record of actual, contemporaneous constitutional violations 
(probably by the states themselves) and then to pass a very narrowly tai-
lored remedy (i.e., a remedy that only targets the states where actual dis-
crimination occurred).  In contrast, the Court will engage in an “intermedi-
ate,” or perhaps even “rational,” congruence and proportionality analysis 
when Congress legislates in arenas where the Court provides something 
greater than rational basis scrutiny.  To pass remedies in these contexts, 
Congress will have to show some history of constitutional violations 
(probably by state and local governments) and then will have to show that 
the remedy provided does not completely subvert the Court’s ability to say 
what the law is and also does not violently disrupt state and local govern-
ment autonomy (more on these limitations in a bit).78   
If we apply these lessons to racial discrimination in voting, we see that 
the Court pretty stringently protects constitutional rights in this arena.  The 
Court protects against racial discrimination in all areas of government ac-
tion, including voting, by engaging in strict scrutiny.79  Indeed, even out-
side the context of race discrimination, the Court more carefully examines 
laws that implicate the electoral process.80  So, like the FMLA and Title II, 
                                                                                                                          
 
77. It is true that United States v. Morrison involved the Court’s rejection of a rem-
edy aimed at gender discrimination.  529 U.S. 598 (2000).  However, much of Morrison 
relates to Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 607-19.  Moreover, the por-
tion of Morrison that does deal with Congress’ enforcement power almost entirely concerns 
the idea that Congress can only use its enforcement power against state actors.  Id. at 619-
26.  In short, Morrison amounts to an atypical decision within the Court’s recent pro-
nouncements about the scope of Congress’ enforcement power.  See Althouse, supra note 
65, at 1789.  “Unlike Hibbs and all of the other cases in the City of Boerne line, however, 
Morrison looked at a statute that created a claim against private individuals.”  Id. 
 78. See infra Part I.C. 
 79. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 650 (remarking that strict scrutiny should apply to a racial 
gerrymander because the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence “always has re-
served the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of race.”). 
 80. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (noting in a one person, one vote case that “any 
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Congress will have a much easier time compiling a historical record of 
actual constitutional violations by state and local governments to justify the 
imposition of a remedy when racial discrimination in voting is at stake. 
Again, though, the obvious question arises as to why the Court should 
give more deference to Congress’ enforcement power depending on the 
context.  In fact, it seems counterintuitive for the Court to defer to Con-
gress’ judgment in areas where the Court itself more strictly enforces con-
stitutional norms.81  Put more concretely, if Congress engages in race-based 
decision-making then it is subjected to strict scrutiny, but if Congress man-
dates that state and local governments engage in race-based decision-
making then Congress gets a slightly freer hand.  How can one square these 
seemingly inapposite treatments of Congress’ ability to mandate the use of 
race? 
                                                                                                                          
 
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously 
scrutinized.”).  See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (describing how “as a 
general matter, ‘before the right (to vote) can be restricted, the purpose of the restriction and 
the assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny’”) 
(quoting Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970)); Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626-27 (de-
scribing how state apportionment statutes and statutes denying the franchise to certain citi-
zens are subject to “close scrutiny” by the Court); Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 (recognizing, in a 
voting rights case, that “where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal 
Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scru-
tinized and carefully confined.”). 
 Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State’s election 
laws cannot be resolved by any “litmus-paper test” that will separate 
valid from invalid restrictions.  Instead, a court must resolve such a 
challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary liti-
gation.  It must first consider the character and magnitude of the as-
serted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.  It then must identify and 
evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications 
for the burden imposed by its rule.  In passing judgment, the Court must 
not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those inter-
ests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it 
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.  Only after weighing all these 
factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the chal-
lenged provision is unconstitutional. 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (citations omitted).   
 81. Marcia L. McCormick, Federalism Re-Constructed: The Eleventh Amend-
ment’s Illogical Impact on Congress’ Power, 37 IND. L. REV. 345, 363 (2004).  
It is counter-intuitive that where Congress has the greatest power to 
make classifications of individuals under its own equal protection and 
due process limitations, it has the least power to require states to comply 
with its classifications.  Conversely, where Congress has the least power 
to make classifications, it has the greatest power to regulate the states. 
Id. 
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They can be synthesized if you consider the twin rationales for con-
gruence and proportionality—separation of powers and federalism82—
combined with the text and general gist of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments.  All the Reconstruction Amendments give Congress a role as the 
Court’s co-enforcer of the Amendments.83  So it makes sense, from a sepa-
ration of powers perspective, to give Congress a slightly greater amount of 
leeway to protect constitutional rights in situations where the Court, as a 
co-enforcer, provides greater scrutiny in the protection of constitutional 
rights.  A similar rationale applies to federalism concerns.  If the Court 
evinces a willingness in particular contexts to be tougher on state and local 
governments because the Reconstruction Amendments were meant to allow 
the Court to be more intrusive into state and local affairs, then it makes 
sense for Congress, as a co-enforcer, to also have a slightly greater ability 
to intrude into state and local affairs.84 
                                                                                                                          
 
         82. See Althouse, supra note 65, at 1787 (describing the dual rationales for congru-
ence and proportionality). 
 83. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2, XIV, § 5, XV, § 2; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-81 (2000).  “It is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e] 
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,’ and its conclusions are entitled to much deference.”  Id. (alterations in original) (cita-
tions omitted).  See also McCormick, supra note 81, at 362-63 (describing Congress’ role as 
a “coequal” in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 84. Contra Erwin Chemerinsky, Real Discimination?, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
97, 108 (2004) (arguing that there is no “apparent reason why the level of scrutiny for a type 
of discrimination should define the scope of Congress’s [enforcement] power.”). 
Professor Ellen D. Katz has similarly observed that Congress has greater power to enforce 
the prohibition on racial discrimination in voting.  Katz, supra note 5, at 2343 (arguing that 
“Congress possesses broad discretion to free state political processes of racial discrimina-
tion, but enjoys far more limited authority to combat other forms of discrimination at the 
state and local level.”).  Professor Katz finds the main rationale for this deference to be 
federalism, in that “[f]ostering effective state governance is thought to render unnecessary 
more intrusive and extensive federal regulation, and thus most faithfully to comport with the 
federal structure.”  Id. at 2346.  Her thesis is clever, interesting, and may well be correct.  
However, I think there is something more going on here, as the Court has recently shown a 
great deal of deference to congressional power to enforce gender and disability discrimina-
tion that would seem to have little to do with fostering democracy at the local and state 
level.  In fairness, though, Professor Katz’s article was penned before the Court’s recent 
decision upholding Title II of the ADA.  Moreover, she also recognized that deference in the 
realm of racial discrimination in voting did not necessarily “preclude[] deference to Con-
gress in other arenas.”  Id. at 2344. 
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C.     RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IS DIFFERENT, BUT LET’S NOT GET 
CARRIED AWAY 
The macro theory amounts to the idea that the Court considers racial 
discrimination in voting to be different both from a substantive equal pro-
tection perspective and from a congressional enforcement power perspec-
tive.  That gives section 2, or any other congressional remedy aimed at ra-
cial discrimination in voting, a certain modicum of deference from the 
Court.  This modicum of deference, though, does not by any means give 
Congress plenary power to pass whatever legislation it chooses when it 
comes to racial discrimination in voting.85  What flows from this deference 
is a bit of latitude when it comes to tailoring a remedy to fit the problem of 
voting-related racial discrimination; a deference analogous to the deference 
provided to the University of Michigan Law School when the Court was 
determining whether that institution had a narrowly tailored race-based 
affirmative action program.86 
In my view, the meaning of narrow tailoring in the context of voting 
remedies related to racial discrimination enacted by Congress will boil 
down to the impact of the remedy on the twin rationales proffered by the 
Court for limiting Congress’ enforcement power—separation of powers 
and federalism.  Congress will not be allowed to put the full court press to 
the Court or to state and local governments, with two cases in point being 
how the Court dealt with both the FMLA and Title II.  Both decisions ex-
plicitly stressed the manner in which these remedies somewhat complied 
with the Court’s idea of the substance of constitutional rights87 and gener-
ally complied with the Court’s idea that state and local governments not be 
overly-burdened by Congress.88  With that in mind, it’s time to move away 
                                                                                                                          
 
 85. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 508 (1992) (noting that 
“[d]eference does not mean acquiescence.”). 
 86. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309.  “Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of 
every conceivable race-neutral alternative.  Nor does it require a university to choose be-
tween maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educa-
tional opportunities to members of all racial groups.”  Id. 
 87. Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1994 (describing how Title II, as applied to access to the 
courts, “is perfectly consistent with the well-established due process principle that, ‘within 
the limits of practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard’ in its courts” (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971))); Hibbs, 
538 U.S. at 723 (describing how the FMLA complies with the Court’s general nondiscrimi-
nation bent by providing a remedy for “all eligible employees, irrespective of gender.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 88. Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1993 (describing the “limited” remedy and how states need 
not “employ any and all means” to provide access to the disabled); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 
(describing the FMLA as “narrowly targeted at the fault line between work and family.”).  
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from a general theory about racial discrimination in voting being different 
and toward a specific analysis of whether section 2 can withstand the 
Court’s separation of powers and federalism concerns. 
II.     SECTION 2 IS NOT A VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Separation of powers and federalism comprise the Court’s twin moti-
vations for curbing Congress’ power to pass legislative remedies that pre-
vent a greater amount of government action than would be prevented by the 
Constitution standing alone.  So let us move to the specifics of separation 
of powers as it relates to racial discrimination.  Section 2 generally impli-
cates the Court’s equal protection/strict scrutiny doctrine because it in-
volves the use of a race-based, affirmative action-type remedy.  However, 
it primarily affects the Court’s equal protection doctrine by specifically 
switching one particular subset of the Court’s jurisprudence—the standard 
for proving unconstitutional vote dilution.  Under the Constitution, a plain-
tiff must demonstrate that an electoral system was established or main-
tained for a discriminatory purpose in order to succeed on a vote dilution 
claim, whereas section 2 replaces that purpose standard with a test of dis-
criminatory results.89 
So, section 2 amounts to something different than the constitutional 
standard enunciated by the Court, with the statute giving greater protection 
to minority voters than would be provided under the Constitution because a 
results standard places a lesser burden of proof on a vote dilution plaintiff 
than a purpose standard.  For example, at a minimum, section 2 makes it 
easier for plaintiffs to prove racial discrimination in voting because federal 
judges are less likely to find local officials to be engaging in activity that 
has a discriminatory purpose than engaging in activity that has discrimina-
tory results.90  Yet section 2 cannot be rendered invalid merely because it 
replaces a purpose test with a results test, as even the current Court has 
consistently recognized that Congress can provide some remedies that go 
beyond what the judiciary itself might conjure up on a case-by-case basis.91 
                                                                                                                          
 
See also Winston Williams, Check and Checkmate: Congress’s Section 5 Power After 
Hibbs, 71 TENN. L. REV. 315, 331-32 (2004) (describing the importance of the narrow scope 
of the FMLA to the Court’s holding that the statute passed the congruence and proportional-
ity test). 
 89. Supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 90. Karlan, supra note 16, at 735. 
 91. See Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1985.  “We have thus repeatedly affirmed that ‘Congress 
may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, 
in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.’” Id. (internal quotes omitted).  See 
also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727 (stating that “Congress may, in the exercise of its . . . [enforce-
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What really underpins the Court’s separation of powers concern is the 
potential for Congress to enact a remedy with the intent or effect of totally 
subverting the will of a majority of the Court.  Put differently, the Court’s 
worries seem to stem from the possibility that Congress could completely 
thumb its nose at the Court’s ability to define the contours of what violates 
the Constitution.  In essence, the paradigm of this problem is the case that 
first established the congruence and proportionality doctrine—City of 
Boerne v. Flores—where, hot on the heels of a decision by the Court that 
changed the constitutional standard for proving religious discrimination, 
Congress tried to summarily reverse the Court.92 
Some have argued, though, that section 2 represents an analogous fact 
scenario to that presented in Boerne.93  In some sense that is right, but it is 
only half the story, and understanding why it is only half the story necessi-
tates a short lesson in the history of vote dilution jurisprudence. 
In the early 1970s, the Court decided White v. Regester.94  In White, 
the Court held that minority plaintiffs could successfully attack electoral 
systems under the Constitution by proving vote dilution from an amalga-
mation of factors, few of which directly implicated government decision-
makers as having acted with a discriminatory purpose.  Moreover, White 
also did not seem to require a federal court to make an ultimate finding that 
the electoral system was purposefully discriminatory in order to conclude 
that a constitutional violation had occurred.95  In essence, the lesson of 
                                                                                                                          
 
ment] power, do more than simply prescribe conduct that we have held unconstitutional.”); 
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (noting that “Congress is not limited to mere legislative repetition 
of this Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.”); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 (stating that “[r]ather, 
Congress’ power ‘to enforce’ the [Fourteenth] Amendment includes the authority both to 
remedy and to deter violations of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat 
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s 
text.”); Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 638 (noting Congress’ enforcement power allows for 
passage of statutes even if those statutes “prohibit[ ] conduct which is not itself unconstitu-
tional . . .”); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (stating that “[l]egislation which deters or remedies 
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if 
in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes on ‘legis-
lative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.’”). 
 92. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513-14.  See also Althouse, supra note 65, at 1785 (de-
scribing RFRA as “a statute explicitly designed to overrule a Supreme Court decision.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 5, at 2403-04.  Accord Richard A. Williamson, The 
1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Statutory Analysis of the Revised Bailout 
Provisions, 62 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 15-16 n.81 (1984).  “The 1982 amendment to § 2 was for 
the express purpose of declaring the congressional intent that a violation of the statute could 
be established by showing the discriminatory effect of the challenged practice.”  Id. 
         94.  412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
         95. Id. at 765-66.  See also Frank R. Parker, The ‘Results’ Test of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 718-26 (1983) 
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White was that a minority plaintiff could win a vote dilution case by using 
evidence of discriminatory effect and without proving discriminatory pur-
pose on the part of government officials. 
That all changed in 1980, when the court decided City of Mobile v. 
Bolden.96  In Bolden, a plurality of the Court interpreted or, more accu-
rately, re-interpreted White as requiring a federal court to make a finding 
that the electoral system was purposefully discriminatory.97  Perhaps more 
importantly, the Bolden plurality made it tougher to prove unconstitutional 
vote dilution by requiring more direct evidence of discriminatory purpose.  
In other words, unconstitutional vote dilution could no longer be proved 
using the White evidentiary standard.  The upshot of Bolden was that mi-
nority plaintiffs became saddled with a new constitutional standard that 
made it more difficult to successfully attack the large numbers of state and 
local election systems that did not allow minority voters to elect any of 
their strongly preferred candidates (i.e., minority candidates). 
Bolden earned the Court harsh criticism, and Congress responded to 
this criticism by amending section 2.98  As amended, section 2 allowed 
minority plaintiffs to win a vote dilution case under a “results” standard 
when 
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the 
political processes leading to nomination or election . . . 
are not equally open to participation by members of [a pro-
tected class] . . . in that its members have less opportunity 
than other members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.99   
By all accounts, the results standard represented a return to the pre-Bolden 
constitutional rule,100 as much of the key statutory language came straight 
out of White.101 
                                                                                                                          
 
(canvassing the pre-Bolden standard for proving unconstitutional vote dilution). 
 96. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 97. Id. at 65. 
 98. See Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal 
Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328, 347 (1982) (noting the criticism generated by Bolden). 
         99. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000). 
 100. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (plurality opinion) (describing 
the amendment to section 2 as “largely a response to this Court’s plurality opinion in Mobile 
v. Bolden.”).  See also Kathryn Abrams, ‘Raising Politics Up’: Minority Political Participa-
tion and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 458 (1988) (describing 
the reason that Congress amended section 2). 
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This history, however, only provides a description of Act I of the con-
stitutional play.  Act II occurred a couple of days after amended section 2 
became law when the Court handed down Rogers v. Lodge102— another 
constitutional vote dilution case.  Rogers retained the Bolden requirement 
that federal courts make an ultimate finding of discriminatory purpose in 
order to hold that an electoral system violates the Constitution.103  How-
ever, Rogers returned the evidentiary standard for proving such purpose 
much closer to the one used by the Court prior to Bolden.  Put differently, 
the way the Court applied the purpose standard in Rogers amounted to 
something remarkably similar to the constitutional standard the Court had 
employed pre-Bolden when a less stringent test existed.104  Yet, to this day, 
it is not uncommon for commentators to give Rogers short shrift when dis-
cussing the constitutional standard for vote dilution105 and the constitutional 
propriety of amended section 2106 even though, when it comes right down 
to it, the evidentiary factors involved in proving a constitutional violation 
                                                                                                                          
 
       101. White, 412 U.S. at 766.  
The plaintiffs’ burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the 
political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally 
open to participation by the group in question--that its members had less 
opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the 
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. 
Id. 
 102. 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 
 103. Id. at 617. 
 104. Id. at 628-29.  “Whatever the wisdom of Mobile, the Court’s opinion cannot be 
reconciled persuasively with that case.  There are some variances in the largely sociological 
evidence presented in the two cases.  But Mobile held that this kind of evidence was not 
enough.”  Id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  See also Joan F. Hartman, 
Racial Vote Dilution and Separation of Powers: An Exploration of the Conflict Between the 
Judicial “Intent” and the Legislative “Results” Standards, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689, 720 
(1982) (describing how “Rogers at least signals a retreat from the Bolden plurality’s single-
minded focus on intent to White v. Regester’s totality of circumstances test”); James F. 
Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives On the Purpose vs. 
Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 675 n.196 (1983) (noting 
how Justice White dissented in Bolden and how “[i]t is at least arguable that Justice White’s 
view of the relevant evidence necessary to establish a claim in a vote dilution case ulti-
mately prevailed in his majority opinion for the Court in Rogers v. Lodge.”). 
       105. Andrew P. Miller & Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act: What Is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EMORY L.J. 1 (1987) (engaging in an ex-
tended discussion of vote dilution jurisprudence with only the most limited citation to and 
discussion of Rogers). 
 106. See generally Katz, supra note 5, at 2402-08 (engaging in extended discussion 
of the constitutionality of section 2 without citation to Rogers).  But see Guard, supra note 
21, at 359 (noting that “the heavy burden for proving unconstitutional vote dilution ap-
proved in Bolden has been lessened by the Court in Rogers v. Lodge, which allows an infer-
ence from impact and effects.”). 
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in Rogers are pretty much the same as the evidentiary factors involved in 
proving a violation of amended section 2.107   
Yet despite the similarities between Rogers and section 2, the latter 
has been interpreted to put substantially more emphasis on three eviden-
tiary factors—the ability to draw a single-member district with a majority 
of minority population, the presence of a cohesive minority voting bloc, 
and the existence of a cohesive majority voting bloc that will usually defeat 
the chosen candidate of the cohesive minority voting bloc.108  Indeed, an 
over-emphasis on these three factors, highlighted by Justice William Bren-
nan’s plurality opinion in the seminal section 2 case of Thornburg v. 
Gingles,109 may have led some federal courts to almost always find a viola-
tion of section 2 whenever these three conditions existed.110  In turn, the 
over-emphasis on these three factors might arguably have placed section 2 
in constitutional jeopardy because it made the provision look like a reflex-
ive use of a race-based remedy through reliance on numbers and statistics 
alone that could have been considered to be the enforcement of some sort 
of proportional representation rule111 or, to put it more starkly, an unconsti-
tutional electoral quota.112 
                                                                                                                          
 
 107. James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of 
Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 32 (1982).   “It is difficult, however, to distinguish the Rogers ‘intent’ test 
from the ‘results’ test of the Voting Rights Act.”  Id.  But see Paul L. McKaskle, The Voting 
Rights Act and the “Conscientious Redistricter,” 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995) (arguing that 
“the 1982 amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was a radical change in the law, 
creating a very strict ‘effects’ test for measuring whether a violation of the Act has oc-
curred.”). 
 108. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011 (1994) (describing “compact-
ness/numerousness, minority cohesion, and majority bloc voting as ‘necessary precondi-
tions’ for establishing vote dilution by use of a multimember district.”).  It is true, however, 
that the courts had used, in addition to these three factors, evidence that a “societal discrimi-
nation against the minority had occurred and continued to occur.”  Id. at 1016.  Neverthe-
less, such “incidents of societal bias [are] to be expected where bloc voting occurs.”  Id. 
 109. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 110. See, e.g., Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 293 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
“it will only be the very unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the existence of 
the three Gingles factors but still have failed to establish a violation of § 2 under the totality 
of the circumstances.”) (quoting Clark v. Calhoun Co., 21 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 111. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-76 (2003) (finding an automatic 
numerical enhancement for minority college applicants to lack the narrow tailoring required 
to meet strict scrutiny). 
       112. See Abigail Thernstrom, Voting Rights: Another Affirmative Action Mess, 43 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 2031, 2038-39 (1996) (linking the idea of “quotas” with “race-driven” 
redistricting). 
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However, the plain language of section 2 expressly denies the federal 
courts the right to mandate proportional representation.113  Moreover, the 
current Court has led the way toward limiting the reach of section 2 so that 
state and local governments are not required to draw majority-minority 
single-member districts whenever the three conditions exist,114 and lower 
                                                                                                                          
 
113. 42 U.S.C. §1973(b) (2000) (providing that “nothing in this section establishes a 
right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in 
the population.”).  
It is important to distinguish between two threads of proportional representation presented 
by section 2—proportional representation in relation to the finding of a section 2 violation 
and proportional representation as related to the remedy for a section 2 violation. See Alan 
Howard & Bruce Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act—Recognizing the Emerg-
ing Political Equality Norm, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1626 n.39 (1983).  “The proviso at 
the end of amended § 2--facially disclaiming that the amendment created an affirmative 
right to proportional representation--is ‘meaningless as a barrier to proportional representa-
tion because . . . it is absolutely silent in addressing remedies, as opposed to the substantive 
violation, required by the results test.’”  Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
When a federal court adjudicates whether or not a section 2 violation exists, it would be 
improper for a court to find a violation whenever minorities have not achieved roughly 
proportional representation.  Take, for example, a hypothetical jurisdiction with a thirty-
three percent minority population and an elected body of nine members from single-member 
districts.  Absent strong evidence (i.e., a substantial amount of direct evidence of purposeful 
discrimination) that the totality of the circumstances shows an unequal opportunity to par-
ticipate in the electoral process, it would be improper for a federal court to find a violation 
of section 2 if minority voters controlled the outcome of the election in two of the nine 
districts even if an additional district could be drawn that would allow for proportional rep-
resentation. 
In contrast, it is proper for a court to use rough proportionality as a guideline for remedying 
a violation of section 2.  This is because a violation of section 2 generally means that minor-
ity voters have been almost completely shut out of the process for some time, so it makes 
sense to give them a maximum amount of relief for having been subjected to this legal 
wrong.  So, returning to the above-described hypothetical jurisdiction, if there were no dis-
tricts in which minority voters controlled the outcome and the totality of circumstances 
indicated a violation of section 2, it would be proper for a federal court to order, as a rem-
edy, the creation of three-majority-minority districts. 
 114. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1009. 
The District Court found that the three Gingles preconditions were satis-
fied, and that Hispanics had suffered historically from official discrimi-
nation, the social, economic, and political effects of which they gener-
ally continued to feel.  Without more, and on the apparent assumption 
that what could have been done to create additional Hispanic superma-
jority districts should have been done, the District Court found a viola-
tion of § 2.  But the assumption was erroneous, and more is required, as 
a review of Gingles will show. 
Id.  See also Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 213, 264 (2003) (recognizing a difference between section 2 as interpreted in Gingles 
and as interpreted in DeGrandy). 
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federal courts have, in turn, followed this lead.115  In fact, from all appear-
ances, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Gingles, which expressed 
concern that Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion served to mask a propor-
tionality standard,116 has probably become the controlling law for finding a 
violation of section 2.117  Thus, section 2, at least as currently interpreted, 
does not require a reflexive resort to a racial calculus that requires any and 
all majority-minority districts to be drawn: it is most definitely not a racial 
quota. 
In sum, section 2 does not represent a separation of powers problem.  
This is because, even though section 2 does not require a finding of pur-
poseful discrimination, the standard the Court uses to determine unconstitu-
tional purpose in the maintenance of an electoral system is relatively simi-
lar and certainly not totally divorced from the standard used in the section 2 
results test.  Relatedly, section 2 does not require a reflexive use of race 
that amounts to an unconstitutional quota.  Separation of powers, however, 
only amounts to one part of the formula for determining whether Congress 
has overstepped its bounds in creating a civil rights remedy against state 
and local governments.  What about federalism? 
III.      SECTION 2 IS NOT AN UNREASONABLE FEDERALISM BURDEN 
The current Court clearly has evinced a general sentiment toward get-
ting Congress off the backs of state and local governments, as a federalism 
revival seems to be the current Court’s signature contribution to constitu-
                                                                                                                          
 
 115. See, e.g., Solomon v. Liberty County Comm’rs, 221 F.3d 1218, 1235 (11th Cir. 
2000) (upholding district court’s finding that no section 2 violation existed even though 
plaintiffs had proven the Gingles preconditions).  See also United States v. Alamosa County, 
306 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1040 (D. Colo. 2004) (stating that “[a]lthough the evidence presented 
at trial is arguably facially sufficient to satisfy the three Gingles preconditions, upon consid-
eration of the totality of the circumstances, it does not prove that the at-large method of 
electing county commissioners in Alamosa County dilutes the vote of Hispanic residents.”). 
 116. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 105 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  “I believe that the Court 
today strikes a different balance than Congress intended to when it codified the results test 
and disclaimed any right to proportional representation under § 2.”  Id. 
 117. For example, in the recent case of Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), 
Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion that cited Gingles sixteen times, with thirteen of those 
cites to her concurring opinion in that case and three to Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion.  
Id. at 478, 480-85.  Admittedly, however, one could argue that Georgia does not speak to 
what section 2 requires because Georgia was not a section 2 case but instead involved the 
Court’s interpretation of a companion provision of the Voting Rights Act—section 5.  But 
see Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act A Victim of Its Own Success?, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1727-28 (2004) (suggesting that Georgia “bring[s] the outcome 
of the section 5 analysis into conformity with” section 2). 
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tional interpretation.  Even so, it is hard to see that the current Court’s (or 
any moderately conservative Court’s) interpretation of section 2 presents an 
insurmountable affront to federalism values.  Indeed, section 2 does not 
pose a much greater burden on the federalist system than the constitutional 
standard imposed by the Court in Rogers.  Moreover, even assuming sec-
tion 2 places some extra burden on federalism, that burden surely seems to 
not be an unreasonable one. 
Before taking on the federalism burden of section 2, however, it is 
useful to take a brief diversion into the two different types of remedies 
Congress can pass under its enforcement power.  These could roughly be 
characterized as “judicial” and “strict liability.”  A judicial remedy is just 
that.  It creates a remedy that provides a standard “designed to control cases 
and controversies” for a particular cause of action against a state or local 
government.118  For example, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act cre-
ated a cause of action and a different judicial standard for plaintiffs who 
sued state and local governments for religious discrimination.119  Another 
example would be Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, which 
creates a cause of action and a different judicial standard for proving em-
ployment-related disability discrimination.120 
In contrast, a “strict liability” remedy only creates a cause of action 
against a state or local government for failing to follow some relatively 
clearly defined course of action.  For example, the Family and Medical 
Leave Act mandates that a state provide up to twelve weeks of time off for 
an employee under certain circumstances.121  No (or at least not many)122 
ifs, ands, or buts.  Another example of a strict liability remedy would be a 
complete ban on literacy tests as a prerequisite for voter registration.123  
These strict liability remedies are enforceable in court, but they do not 
really set down a different judicial standard by, for example, changing a 
purpose test to an effects test for an entire class of cases.  Also, unlike judi-
cial remedies, strict liability remedies tend to be narrower in their scope, 
touching only upon a small subset of a larger group of activities.  Put more 
                                                                                                                          
 
 118. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
 119. Id. at 515-16 (describing the framework of RFRA). 
 120. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360-61 (describing the framework of Title I of the ADA). 
 121. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724.  “The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 . . . enti-
tles eligible employees to take up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave annually for any of 
several reasons, including the onset of a serious health condition in an employee’s spouse, 
child, or parent.”  Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
 122. Id. at 737-40 (describing conditions placed on employees seeking to invoke 
FMLA rights). 
 123. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(b) (2000) (providing for a nationwide ban on all literacy 
tests). 
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concretely, Title I of the ADA applies to a whole host of employment prac-
tices while the FMLA applies to a very small subset of employment prac-
tices.124 
Section 2 falls pretty squarely into the judicial remedy category,125 and 
generally it would seem that a judicial remedy will have a greater likeli-
hood of violating separation of powers values than of violating federalism 
values.  This is because a judicial remedy does not completely rule out a 
particular course of conduct by state and local government, but instead 
requires plaintiffs to prove their substantive case before a federal judge.  
That said, the larger the amount of government conduct reached and the 
further away the judicial remedy gets from the Court’s view of the sub-
stance of constitutional rights, the greater the federalism cost of a judicial 
remedy.  A judicial remedy also incurs greater federalism costs when Con-
gress makes monetary damages available to plaintiffs. 
Section 2, however, does not incur much of a federalism cost on any 
of these fronts.  As previously mentioned, section 2 does not stray very far 
from the Court’s view of the substance of constitutional rights.  Section 2 
also implicates only a relatively finite amount of government activity; that 
which is voting-related.  Finally, section 2 does not incur federalism costs 
in terms of money damages—unlike the Patent Act and some other con-
                                                                                                                          
 
       124. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738 (describing the FMLA as “narrowly targeted at the fault 
line between work and family,” unlike other statutes rejected under the congruence and 
proportionality standard that “applied broadly to every aspect of [the] state employers’ op-
erations.”). 
 125. Some civil rights remedies combine both a judicial and strict liability remedy.  
For example, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires certain state and local governments 
to secure approval from the federal government before implementing any voting change.  42 
U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).  Section 5 provides a strict liability remedy in that private plaintiffs 
can get an injunction preventing the use of any voting practice not approved by the federal 
government, regardless of whether the voting change is discriminatory.  See Clark v. Roe-
mer, 500 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1991) (noting that “[i]f voting changes subject to § 5 have not 
been pre-cleared, § 5 plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting the State from im-
plementing the changes.”).  See also United States v. Louisiana, 952 F.Supp. 1151, 1157-58 
(W.D. La. 1997) (describing elements of proof for plaintiff to garner injunction preventing 
use of non pre-cleared voting change).  Section 5 also provides a judicial remedy by requir-
ing that jurisdictions seeking preclearance prove that their voting changes do not discrimi-
nate in purpose or effect.  Georgia, 539 U.S. at 464 (setting forth the standard for determin-
ing whether a voting change is discriminatory in effect); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 
528 U.S. 320, 340-41 (2000) (setting forth the standard for determining whether a voting 
change is discriminatory in purpose). 
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gressional remedies recently tossed out by the Court,126 section 2 gives 
plaintiffs no right to raid the treasuries of state and local governments.127 
Nevertheless, even if state treasuries are safe, money costs flow from 
the imposition of legal fees.  These fees could arise from hiring lawyers to 
defend lawsuits, or hiring legal advisors (i.e., redistricting consultants) to 
ensure compliance with the law.  But, despite the fact that voting rights 
cases cost quite a bit to litigate,128 section 2 probably does not cost all that 
much on the litigation scale.  States can be sued and must hire legal advi-
sors to comply with the statute, but even absent section 2, state and local 
governments would be sued and would hire legal advisors for voting mat-
ters.  In fact, the Court itself allows plaintiffs to bring a cause of action for 
unconstitutional racial discrimination in voting.  So, if section 2 did not 
exist, there would just be a lot more constitutional claims instead of section 
2 claims; either way, there would probably be a fair amount of litigation.  
Moreover, voting is so loaded with legal rules already that complying with 
section 2 does not cost state and local governments a much greater amount 
of money in legal advice than a world without section 2.  This is not to say 
that there are no legal costs, just probably not a much greater cost.129 
But money, as they say, isn’t everything, and section 2 exacts less 
quantifiable federalism costs, such as the idea that the majority of the peo-
ple who comprise the electorate of state and local governments will not be 
able to choose for themselves their own electoral rules, and instead will 
have those systems thrust upon them by the federal judiciary.  In this way, 
section 2 imposes its greatest burden on the people of state and local gov-
ernments by limiting the use of certain types of electoral features that typi-
cally serve to allow narrow majorities of a jurisdiction’s population to 
completely dominate local governance130—most often by forcing the re-
placement of at-large elections with single-member districts.131 
                                                                                                                          
 
 126. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637 (describing how the Patent Remedy Act was 
intended to provide “compensation” for patent infringement). 
 127. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 744-45 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing the protection 
of “a State’s fiscal integrity from federal intrusion” as an important factor in support of the 
congruence and proportionality doctrine). 
 128. Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. 
L. REV. 1249, 1279 n.173 (1989) (describing the expense of voting rights litigation). 
       129. See Sanford Levinson, The Warren Court Has Left the Building: Some Com-
ments on Contemporary Discussions of Equality, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 121 (2002) 
(discussing the one person, one vote doctrine and noting how “[p]art of the political calculus 
of reapportionment decisions by state legislatures is the knowledge that, almost inevitably, 
they will be challenged in court.”). 
 130. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 616.  “At-large voting schemes and multimember districts 
tend to minimize the voting strength of minority groups by permitting the political majority 
to elect all representatives of the district.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  See also Holder v. 
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However, section 2’s unquantifiable costs do not create a tremendous 
burden on state and local democracies.  After all, it is not like section 2 
thrusts some sort of completely undemocratic system on anyone.  Section 2 
does not remove anybody’s right to cast a ballot to choose their representa-
tives and their manner of governance.  What section 2 primarily accom-
plishes is the granting of some measure of electoral success to populations 
who might otherwise continue to be almost always completely shut out of 
the electoral spoils.132  This is not to say that state and local governments 
do not lose some of their freedom in the balance; it’s just to say that state 
and local governments do not really lose an overwhelming amount of free-
dom. 
Yet what about the idea that at-large election systems might constitute 
a superior form of electing representatives than single-member districts, 
and state and local governments lose the benefits that inure from at-large 
systems?133  This could be true, but such an argument is really just a 
coffeehouse debate that no one will ever really definitively win.134  And 
even if some “good governance” cost arises from using single-member 
districts, certainly some democratic benefit flows from creating state and 
local governing bodies that have more of an opportunity to look like their 
constituencies and “to ensure that representative bodies are responsive to 
the entire electorate”135—with this responsiveness perhaps resulting in the 
establishment of a greater quantum of confidence in the fairness of our 
government for some portion of the electorate and, thus, greater stability.136 
                                                                                                                          
 
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 898 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the perceived advan-
tage of single-member districts as “their tendency to enhance the ability of any numerical 
minority in the electorate to gain control of seats in a representative body.”). 
 131. Davidson & Grofman, supra note 3. 
       132. Hartman, supra note 104, at 692 (describing how an at-large election system 
“can operate to exclude the minority completely from access to the channels of govern-
ment.”). 
       133. See Ortiz, supra note 54, at 1129-30 (describing the benefits of at-large elec-
tions). 
 134. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 901 (Thomas, J., concurring) (remarking that “there are 
undoubtedly an infinite number of theories of effective suffrage, representation, and the 
proper apportionment of political power in a representative democracy.”).   
 135. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 640 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
       136. Hartman, supra note 104, at 738.  “The presence of minority representatives in 
the councils of government performs the valuable function of creating a sense of shared 
responsibilities and shared rewards between majority and minority and may enhance the 
stability of the system.”  Id.  See also Donald P. Kommers, The Right to Vote and Its Imple-
mentation, 4 N.D. L. REV. 365, 366-67 (1964).   
Indeed, if citizens are not allowed to participate in electoral processes or 
are made to feel that they do not belong, they cannot be expected to de-
velop any genuine loyalty to the political system under which they live 
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But the Court has hinted that federalism concerns require the federal 
judiciary to give some amount of deference to states when reviewing the 
propriety of redistricting plans.137  However, what drives this deference is 
not really adherence to federalist principles, but an adherence to the idea of, 
as much as possible, keeping the Court out of the political process.138  
Moreover, even if some sort of federalism interest exists in leaving district-
ing to state and local governments, section 2 partially recognizes this inter-
est.  When a federal court finds a section 2 violation that requires the use of 
single-member districts, the federal court always gives the state or local 
entity the opportunity to take first crack at drawing a districting plan that 
remedies the violation.139 
                                                                                                                          
 
and, after a time, may even begin to question the legitimacy of the sys-
tem itself.   
Id.  Accord Paul W. Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Large Elections: The Dilution 
Problem, 10 GA. L. REV. 353, 388-89 (1976) (describing how the election of minority can-
didates “insure[s] a minority viewpoint in deliberations and debate” and “is important psy-
chologically as a symbol of accomplishment and as an indication to minorities that they can 
participate in government.”). 
One could argue that section 2 creates a “cost” of heightened racial awareness, but that 
would really just be bringing in a substantive equal protection argument through the back 
door.  In other words, once you decide to allow some use of race in the voting context, (see, 
e.g., Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234) then it’s hard to say section 2 creates a much greater amount 
of racial consciousness. 
 137. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 915 (1995).  “Federal-court review of districting legisla-
tion represents a serious intrusion on the most vital of local functions.”  Id.  See also id. at 
934-35 (describing the Court’s agreement about how federalism weighs heavily against 
judicial involvement in districting decisions) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Abrams v. 
Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 101 (1997) (stating that “[t]he task of redistricting is best left to state 
legislatures, elected by the people and as capable as courts, if not more so, in balancing the 
myriad factors and traditions in legitimate districting policies.”).  Accord Holder, 512 U.S. 
at 916 (Thomas, J., concurring).  “Interfering with the form of government, therefore, might 
appear to involve a greater intrusion on state sovereignty [than interfering with districting 
plans].”  Id. 
 138. See Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 242 (stating that districting decisions “ordinarily 
fall[] within a legislature’s sphere of competence” because “the legislature ‘must have dis-
cretion to exercise the political judgment necessary to balance competing interests.’”) (quot-
ing Miller, 515 U.S. at 915). 
 139. See McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 150 n.30 (1981).  “Our prior decisions 
in the apportionment area indicate that, in the normal case, a court that has invalidated a 
State’s existing appointment plan should enjoin implementation of that plan and give the 
legislature an opportunity to devise an acceptable replacement before itself undertaking the 
task of reapportionment.”  Id.  See, e.g., Citizens for Good Govt. v. City of Quitman, 148 
F.3d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting the general principle that a federal court should, after 
finding a jurisdiction in violation of section 2, grant the governing body of the jurisdiction 
“an opportunity to enact an acceptable plan.”) (internal quotes omitted).   
 2/21/2005 12:00:51 AM 
2005] AFFIRMATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 213 
The plain fact, as recognized even by the current, federalist-leaning 
Court, remains that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, by their 
nature, contemplate some intrusion by the federal government into state 
and local affairs so as to secure the right to vote.140  Certainly, one can ar-
gue that the Reconstruction Amendments should only empower Congress 
to create racially neutral “access” to cast a ballot through fair rules for 
things like voter registration, rather than to create fair rules to prevent vote 
dilution.141  However, that bus seems to have passed a long time ago.  Once 
one accepts, as a solid majority of the Court seems to have accepted for 
some time now, that electoral systems represent fair game under the Con-
stitution, then it seems hard to convincingly argue that Congress’ statutory 
mandate of a certain type of electoral system amounts to a far more over-
whelming intrusion into the affairs of state and local governments than the 
intrusion of the Constitution itself.142 
CONCLUSION 
Section 2 will be around at least as long as the Court’s jurisprudence 
continues to reflect the moderately conservative values of its current mem-
bers.  Indeed, the Court may soon get a chance to more firmly implant this 
congressional remedy on the Nation’s electoral landscape, as cases bring-
ing congruence and proportionality challenges to section 2 have begun to 
work their way up the judicial hierarchy.143  While other voting rights 
remedies may have greater problems under the Court’s recent decisions, 
                                                                                                                          
 
 140. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 284-85 (1999) (noting that “the 
Voting Rights Act, by its nature intrudes on state sovereignty . . . [and the] Fifteenth 
Amendment permits this intrusion”).  See also City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179 (noting that the 
Reconstruction Amendments “were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power 
and an intrusion on state sovereignty.”); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 173 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
“The Civil War Amendments dramatically altered the relation of the Federal Government to 
the States.”  Id. 
 141. I suspect Justice Clarence Thomas might be a proponent of this kind of theory, 
as he argued in Holder that section 2 should not apply to voting practices that dilute minor-
ity votes.  512 U.S. at 893 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (allowing that “many of the basic 
principles” discussed in his concurrence “are equally applicable to constitutional vote dilu-
tion cases.”). 
       142. This should not be taken as an argument that federal courts use section 2 to 
require the implementation of proportional representation systems such as cumulative vot-
ing.  This is because Congress, in amending section 2, did not endorse such remedies but 
rather endorsed a Supreme Court case in which single-member districts served as the proper 
remedy for vote dilution.  Supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text. 
 143. See, e.g., Blaine County, 363 F.3d at 903-09 (applying the congruence and 
proportionality standard to section 2). 
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primarily owing to federalism concerns, section 2’s place in our system of 
government will remain secure. 
